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De ba te 
B R U C E  L AW R E N C E  
There is a new stress on civil society. It has come in
the aftermath of the Cold War, and in some sense it
still perpetuates the Cold War. Equated with private
property, the market, and pluralistic culture Ð the fa-
miliar teleological mantra of neo-liberalism Ð civil so-
ciety is trotted out as the answer to all issues of glob-
al competitiveness and national reconstruction. 
Neither Civil  nor
Info Society 
offers Muslims the
Hope of Global Equity 
The history and current deployment of the
use of civil society apply but obliquely to Arab
civil society, as is apparent from the most sig-
nificant study yet on this crucial topic: R. Au-
gusus Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East, 2
vols. (E.J.Brill: Leiden, 1995-1996). The scope
of this edited volume is vast and includes an
overview of Middle East and North Africa, and
then country-by-country analyses. If the les-
sons for civil society in the Middle East are so-
ber, they depend on grappling with an elu-
sive term that does not resonate at the same
level for all researchers. In the preamble to a
study of the Jordanian case, we are told that: 
ÕIn traditional western writing É civil
society has been associated with the de-
velopment of capitalism, with the right
to private property, and the need to
protect other individual (initially, male)
rights É Civil society is defined by three
elements: associational life (including
political parties outside the state), citi-
zenship (meaning full rights and re-
sponsibilities), and civility in interaction
É It is concerned above all with a liber-
alization process, with carving out an
even larger realm for civil non-state, as-
sociational activity and for civil rights.Õ
A quite different, more nuanced, model of
civil society appears elsewhere in the same
volume. On the one hand, Ôcivilian rule, citi-
zenship, civisme, civility, civil liberties Ð all
are remedies to different forms of despotism
and all are evoked by the term Òcivil societyÓ.
ÉYet not all these remedies go together
and none of them is easily achieved É The
protection of individual liberty, for instance,
proscribes imposing conformity of values or
identity upon the citizenry and hence con-
tributes little to nurturing the solidarity de-
mocracies require. Civil liberties and civic
spirit may then be modestly conflicting
goals, and (we should not be surprised) that
democracies everywhere experience a con-
flict between the goals of liberty and com-
munity.Õ Neither of these definitions, or the
cases they explore, calls into question the
relevance of civil society to Arab/Muslim so-
cieties. Not so in the case of Gaza. When we
look at the evidence of Gaza, civil society ap-
pears in a starkly different light. Sara Roy, au-
thor of the essay on Gaza, challenges extant
models of civil society as they apply, or do
not apply, to Gaza. She begins by posing a
contrast between the liberal pluralist model
and the Marxist model  la Gramsci: 
ÕThe liberal pluralist model posits an
arena of potential freedom where citizens
can engage in voluntary associations
apart from, but not in opposition to, the
state. By contrast, the Gramscian model
privileges civil society over the state. It
sees civil society as a weapon against cap-
italism, not an accommodation to it. Civil
society becomes the sphere of resistance,
where those who are marginalized, domi-
nated, and exploited can struggle against
state control. Who struggles? The family,
political parties and labour unions, in-
deed, all those who are intent on mobiliz-
ing opposition to state-directed, capital-
ist-motivated hegemonic practices.Õ 
In a deft move, at once original and produc-
tive, Roy then goes on to note how both
models Ð the liberal pluralist and the Gram-
scian resistant Ð presume a certain kind of
state. Both presume that there is a unitary
state, but with limited powers. They also
presume that pluralism is invariably good,
at once welcoming difference and promot-
ing tolerance. Further, they presume that
there exists a kind of social contract about
what counts as good. Finally, they aver what
Michael Walzer calls Ôspeaking in proseÕ, that
is, a normal life. Yet Roy goes on to demon-
strate that neither of these models can ap-
ply in Gaza because neither the state nor the
society is unitary; not only moral consensus
but even normality are elusive, if not fictive.
The result? ÔThe possibility of civil unrestÕ,
concludes Roy, Ôappears greater than the ca-
pacity of civil society to address it.Õ Let us
call this the Liberal Model (of civil society),
in a phrase from Michael Gilsenan, Turned
Inside Out. 
Even while there is keen attention to the
benefits of civil society in many quarters,
there are also other moves to go beyond the
traditional concept and use of civil society. If
Roy questions its applicability in the desper-
ate circumstances of current day Gaza, oth-
ers note that it no longer applies at the top
end of the global/local hierarchy, to those
empowered by the Information Age. It may
be time to explore a radical prospect: civil
society has been, or is about to be sur-
passed by, cyber society. 
Are we perhaps witnessing not merely
new forms of social practice and labour that
limit the utility of civil society, as in Gaza,
but also the rapid shift from a state-civil so-
ciety model to an all-pervasive information
society? Whether we call it an information
society or cyber society, its very possibility
underscores the radical technological shifts
that envelop both the state and its adjuncts,
including civil society, especially but not
solely in Western Europe and North Ameri-
ca. It was Marshall Hodgson, the major Is-
lamic historian of the 20t h century, who
warned us in an essay published over 30
years ago (in 1967) that the speed and
scope of technicalism would overwhelm not
only Orientals but also Occidentals: both the
West and the East would be transformed by
Ôthe expectation of continuous innovationÕ
and its (often unintended) consequences. 
Among the major respondents to techni-
calism has been Manuel Castells. A Berkeley
urban sociologist, Castells has tried to theo-
rize the unexpected advent of the computer
and also to assess its long-term social im-
pact. Looking at what Hodgson termed the
latest phase in the cumulative history of the
whole Afro-Eurasian Oikumene, Castells
calls it the Information Age. Like HodgsonÕs
earlier trilogy, CastellsÕ The Information Age:
Economy, Society and Culture ( B l a c k w e l l Õ s :
1996-98) is at once spatially comprehensive
and boldly predictive. Castells traces how
computer-driven telecommunications have
intensified global interactions at the same
time that they have created innumerable
networks which reconfigure indeterminate,
atomized groups of individuals into new vir-
tual communities. What is emerging, in his
view, is a global network society. The dark
side of the Information Age does not escape
Castells. He notes how informational poli-
tics renders the state less powerful in its su-
pervisory, regulatory and disciplinary func-
tions, and most conservatives would wel-
come that shift, but informational politics
also reduces the protective and redistribu-
tive functions of the state, which most liber-
als would not applaud. Moreover, Castells
laments the Ôblack holes of informational
capitalismÕ. They give rise to social exclusion
and the rise of what he terms Ôthe fourth
worldÕ. The radically divided benefits of the
Information Age portend a global economy
that is at once mercurial and criminal, and
its outcome may well be a prolonged expe-
rience of the ÔNew World disorderÕ. 
Central to CastellÕs argument is the role of
world cities, and world cities as the sites of
immigrant experience. It is, above all, urban
location that defines the current diasporas
of the post-Vietnam and now post-Cold War
eras, in both North America and Western Eu-
rope. Among those refining and developing
an urban accent for the immigrant experi-
ence in late 20t h-century America is the fem-
inist theorist, Saskia Sassen. Her G l o b a l i z a-
tion and its Discontents: Essays on the New
Mobility of People and Money (1998) docu-
ments the pernicious effect of Ôcyber-seg-
mentationsÕ or increasingly disparate and
unfair distribution of economic wealth, so-
cial benefits and life options. For Sasken glo-
balization is above all the hyperlinkage of
global cities through international nodes
which constitute a new transterritorial Ôcen-
treÕ of global economic activity. Yet it is diffi-
cult to give specificity to particular groups
of immigrants, mostly labourers from third
world countries, who participate in this sys-
tem from the margins even while seeking
citizenship on new terms. Civil society drops
out of the discourse, except insofar as it is
inflected through the international human
rights agenda, and the specific groups with
whom we began this survey only reappear
as foreign others Ð not the domestic others
who are both Arab and netizens. Jon Ander-
son has made a singular effort to address
what he calls Ôcybernauts of the Arab Dias-
poraÕ. Yet electronic mediation in transna-
tional cultural identities has impacted over-
seas Arab emigres, exiles, labour migrants,
students and new professionals unevenly,
yet they are often glossed as global citizens,
difficult to analyse socio-economically or to
identify with particular cities, whether in
Western Europe or North America. 
To the extent that the Internet has begun
to connect the global with the local, the
overseas with the home, we are told that
Ôthe members of Middle East diaspora com-
munities most able to reconnect with the
homelands through the Internet are (above
all those) engaged in business, at least ini-
tially.Õ In other words, the commercial class-
es and those related to them who need
commerce-enabling information still have
the greatest access to, and use of, the Inter-
net. And so information technologies re-
main inherently conservative. They rein-
force global capitalist structures and asym-
metries, as Sasken has demonstrated, and
they do not augur a new or revisionist no-
tion of civil society. What we are likely to see
as the lure of cyberfantasies expands is the
further marginalization of the already mar-
ginal. 
Euro-American elites, together with their
Asian, African, and Arab counterparts, will
continue to project interests and promote
options via the Net, but most of their ener-
gies will be directed to non-political goals;
neither a new civil society abroad nor a re-
constituted civil society at home is high on
their list, and to the extent that the under-
valued become less visible as also less em-
powered, we may well wonder how socially
transformative the revolution, which Cas-
tells has deemed the biggest since the in-
vention of the Greek alphabet in 700 BCE,
will be. Muslims, especially the urban poor
in Africa and Asia, will likely be the least of
its beneficiaries.  '
